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Priming Cooperation in Social Dilemma Games
* 
 
Research on public goods mainly focuses its attention on the ability of incentives, beliefs and 
group structure to affect behaviour in social dilemma interactions. This paper investigates the 
pure effects of a rather subtle mechanism on social preferences in a one-shot linear public 
good game. Using priming techniques from social psychology, we activate the concept of 
cooperation and explore the extent to which this intervention brings about changes in 
people’s voluntary contributions to the public good and self-reported emotional responses. 
Our findings suggest that priming cooperation increases contribution levels, controlling for 
subjects’ gender. Our priming effect is much stronger for females than for males. This 
difference can be explained by a shift in subjects’ beliefs about contributions. We also find a 
significant impact of priming on mean positive emotional responses. 
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1. Introduction 
Many important economic and social interactions are characterised by public-
good-type  games  in  which  individuals‟  personal  interests  are  at  odds  with  group 
benefits.  Situations  such  as  voting,  tax  compliance,  corruption,  teamwork, 
environmental protection are real-life instances demonstrating the tension between 
individual and collective rationality and thus, the experimental investigation of why 
people cooperate with  each other  in  such situations  has  been of major interest  to 
economics (see Ledyard, 1995 for a review on earlier findings). By now a great deal 
of research has documented that, while free riding is predicted within the standard 
economic  model,  people  do  not  always  follow  their  pure  self-interest,  exhibiting 
social  preferences  (see  Fehr  and  Fischbacher,  2002  and  DellaVigna,  2009  for 
extensive reviews).  
In particular, laboratory research on public goods games examines the nature 
of the mechanisms that may foster cooperation and bring about behavioural change. 
On  the  one  hand,  most  part  of  the  experimental  literature  explores  the  effects  of 
explicit  interventions  on  cooperative  behaviour.  Such  interventions  comprise 
introducing sanction and reward systems (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002; Sefton 
et al., 2007; Sutter et al., forthcoming), establishing a leader (e.g., Güth, et al., 2007; 
Levati, et al., 2007), and facilitating communication (e.g., Isaac and Walker, 1988; 
Bochet  et  al,  2006).  These  explicit  mechanisms  have  been  found  to  significantly 
impact on the provision of public goods and help reduce the extent to which people 
free ride. 
On  the  other  hand,  and  to  a  much  lesser  extent,  experimental  studies 
investigate  whether  and  if  so,  how  pro-social  behaviour  in  social  dilemmas  is 
influenced  by  rather  subtle  interventions,  such  as  framing  (e.g.,  Andreoni,  1995; 
Dufwenberg et al, 2006; Cubitt et al, 2008) and non-binding cooperation defaults 
(Altmann  and  Falk,  2009).  In  this  paper,  we  contribute  to  this  literature  by 
investigating  the  effects  of  another  subtle  intervention,  namely,  priming,  on  free 
riding behaviour in a social dilemma game. Priming, which is formally defined as 
“the procedural feature that some previously activated information impacts on the 
processing of subsequent information” (see Hertel & Fiedler, 1998), is a prominent 
topic  in  social  and  cognitive  psychology  (e.g.,  Hertel  &  Fiedler,  1994;  Hertel  &   3 
Fiedler, 1998; Kay et al., 2004; Smeesters et al., 2003; Utz et al., 2004).
2 For instance, 
it has been demonstrated that priming people to think about the last two digits of their 
social security number influences their willingness to pay for different types of goods 
(see Ariely et al., 2003). In their meta-analysis, Bargh and Ferguson (2000) found that 
social behaviour can be carried out without the interaction of the conscious acts of 
will and guidance, and priming will have a great deal on this subconscious behaviour, 
while Vlaev and Dolan (2009) suggest that priming can be used to actively change a 
range of behaviours, especially health and altruistic behaviours. 
Inspired  by  the  existing  psychological  literature,  as  we ll  as  by  recent 
economics research indicating that elements of the choice environment affect people‟s 
pro-social behaviour, we address a question that is of special interest to economists 
(and  also  to  economic  policy-makers):  Does  priming  make  people  more  socially 
oriented in an incentivised environment where personal and collective interests are at 
odds? This is our novel contribution to the literature as no previous studies have 
investigated priming in an economic game where there is a clear financial incentive to 
free ride.  
Priming  has  little  to  do  with  the  standard  economic  model.  Taking 
DellaVigna‟s (2009) description of non-standard factors in economics, priming is part 
of  non-standard  decision-making,  and  the  implications  of  priming  are  large.  It 
essentially suggests that if priming impacts on our behaviours, and does not impact on 
different information and different incentives, then the standard economic model is 
missing  a  significant  aspect  of  individual  behaviours.  For  this  reason,  it  seems 
important to the economics literature to examine whether priming can be successfully 
used to encourage behaviours that are deemed essential to both individual and social 
advancements.    
We tested whether activating the concept of cooperation through the use of 
priming  techniques  adapted  from  social  psychology  (see  Bargh  et  al,  2001)  leads 
people to behave pro-socially. We assumed that by heightening the accessibility of the 
idea  of  cooperation  in  a  social  dilemma,  individuals  would  raise  their  voluntary 
contributions towards the common resource, as  priming would act a subconscious 
reminder of the concept of cooperation. 
                                                 
2 At this point, it is worth emphasising that priming is a distinct notion from framing. The concept of 
framing refers to the re-description of a logically equivalent decision problem in a positive or negative 
light, whereas, priming refers to the implicit activation of some previously stored knowledge, without 
requiring the re-description of the decision problem.    4 
Specifically,  our  concern  is  with  whether  priming  impacts  on  revealed 
preferences, and the affective responses to those preferences. In terms of revealed 
preferences, we analyse the actual contributions made by subjects to a one-shot public 
good game. This provides us with a behavioural measure of how much subjects are 
prepared to respond practically to our subtle intervention by contributing their own 
resources to the public good. In terms of affective responses, we use subjects‟ self-
reported emotions, which are a complementary tool for identifying whether subjects 
respond to others‟ contributions differently depending on the primes. Our interest in 
emotions  stems  from  the  fact  that  they  have  played  a  central  role  in  the  social 
preferences  literature  in  various  contexts  (e.g.,  Bosman  and  van  Winden,  2002, 
forthcoming; van Winden et al., 2008). In particular, regarding the setting of social 
dilemmas,  recent  laboratory  research indicates that  emotions  generate and explain 
economic  behaviour,  with  positive/negative  emotions  being  connected  with 
positive/negative concerns (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Cubitt et al., 2008). 
Summarising  the  main  findings  of  our  study,  they  suggest  that  priming 
subjects  to  cooperation  increases  their  voluntary  contributions  significantly, 
controlling for subjects‟ gender. With respect to priming, positively primed females 
behave  in  a  more  generous  manner  than  neutrally  primed  females  and  positively 
primed males. This gender effect can be explained by a difference in their beliefs 
about  others‟  contributions.  Turning  to  self-reported  emotional  responses,  our 
findings  record  a positive and significant  impact  that priming has  on  individuals‟ 
emotional responses, which is more pronounced with respect to their mean positive 
emotions (namely, happiness, joy and warmth). 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the 
design  and  the  hypotheses  for  our  experiment.  Our  experimental  findings  are 
presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes and discusses the implications of priming 
for the design of public policy. 
 
2. Experimental Design & Hypotheses 
2.1 Our framework: The linear public goods game 
The main framework for our analysis is the linear public goods game (see 
Ledyard,  1995,  for  an  overview),  which  is  a  stylized  model  in  the  experimental 
literature to study cooperation issues. In summary, this game captures the pure tension 
between  individual  gains  and  social  efficiency.  The  structure  of  the  linear  public   5 
goods game for our experiment is as follows. A group of 3 participants is randomly 
formed and each participant within a group receives a fixed amount of 20 tokens. We 
refer to this as his/her endowment. Participants simultaneously have to decide how 
many (out of 20) tokens to keep for themselves and how many to contribute to the 
public good, described to subjects as a project. Each token contributed to the public 
good  is  deducted  from  this  participant‟s  private  account  (that  is,  20  –  his/her 
contribution). For  each  token a participant  keeps  for himself/herself, he/she has  a 
return of 1 money unit, whereas, for each token he/she contributes to the public good, 
each member of the group – regardless of whether someone has contributed or not – 
has a return of 0.5 money units, creating a total benefit of 1.5 tokens for the entire 
group. This implies that the total earnings from the contributions to the public good 
are  equally  distributed  among  all  members  of  the  same  group.  The  payoff  for 
participant i is given as follows: 

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Since the cost for the contributing subject is 1 money unit per token, while the 
private return is only 0.5  money units, a selfish participant has a lways an economic 
incentive to contribute nothing to the public good and rely on the contribution of other 
participants. Yet, Pareto efficiency requires that all participants fully contribute their 
endowment to the public good (in this case each participan t receives an income equal 
to 30 money units, which is greater than his/her initial endowment). 
 
2.2 Design 
The main focus of our experiment is to assess how people respond to priming 
both  behaviourally  and  emotionally.  As  tools  to  measure  these  effects,  we  use 
contributions to public goods (i.e. revealed preferences) and self-reported emotional 
responses. Our experimental design consists of two treatments: one in which people 
are neutrally primed and another in which they are positively primed. We refer to the 
resulting  treatments  as  NP-treatment  and  P-treatment,  respectively.  Before  we 
conduct the experiment, participants were randomly allocated to each of these two 
treatments. 
Our procedure of priming subjects follows a methodology commonly used in 
other  psychological  experiments  (see,  for  instance,  Bargh,  et  al,  2001).  More   6 
specifically, the priming manipulation was carried out through an initial word-search 
puzzle  that  each  participant  completed  by  him/herself  at  the  beginning  of  the 
experimental session. A 16×16  matrix of letters  was  presented,  along  with  which 
there was a list of 20 words that were embedded in the matrix. Words could appear 
with letters in a straight line either from left to right or from right to left reading down 
or reading up, and diagonally reading either down or up. Each list contained the same 
set of 5 neutral words to be found (carpet, lamp, plant, shampoo, window), with the 
remaining 15 words being (or not) relevant to the concept of cooperation (depending 
on  the  treatment).  In  the  P-treatment,  these  words  were  teamwork,  assist, 
responsibility, participate, community, collaborate, mutual, united, share, collective, 
society, trust, harmony, contribute and support.
3 In the NP-treatment, these words 
were butterfly, turtle, umbrella, salad, corkscrew, illustrate, hat, building, gasoline, 
river, ranch, mountain, cabbage, stapler and peach. 
The instructions for the word-search puzzles informed participants that they 
would have a total of 10 minutes to find as many words as they could, but their total 
earnings from the experiment will not be affected by their performance in this task. At 
the end of the allotted time, the experimenter handed out to subjects the solutions of 
the word search puzzle, so that they are aware of the correct answers in order for 
everyone in the treatment group to be primed. 
After  subjects  had  completed  the  first  task,  subjects  were  given  new 
instructions describing the second task which consisted of the linear public goods 
game, outlined in Section 2.1.
4 The description of the second task was identical under 
both treatments. Subjects had to decide how many tokens of their initial endowment 
they were willing to contribute. After they make their contribution decisions, they 
were asked to state their beliefs about contributions of the other group members. It is 
worth  noting  that  elicitation  of  beliefs  was  non -incentivised  to  avoid  possible 
confounding effects with the elicitation of self-reported emotions. 
                                                 
3 Selection of the positive priming words was based on a pre-test in which 50 words were judged with 
regards to their relatedness to cooperation. 28 pre-test participants were recruited in order to judge 
these 50 words and ratings were made on a 7-point scale (1 = “not at all”, …, 7 = “very much”). Pre-
test participants received a fixed payment of £5 for completing this task. The selected primes were 
those with the highest ratings. Appendix A provides the complete list of the 50 words used, along with 
their corresponding average scores. 
4 The instructions used for both tasks are given in Appendix B. As we wanted to ensure that subjects 
understood the decision situation, at the end of the experimental instructions all participants answered 
several test questions, concerning what the payoffs would be for various hypothetical configurations of 
behaviour.   7 
In an attempt to assess the impact of priming on non-behavioural indicators of 
perceptions of free-riding behaviour, we also elicited subjects‟ emotional responses. 
More specifically, subjects were asked at the end of the game in each treatment to 
indicate  the  intensity  of  positive  and  negative  affect  they  felt  about  the  actual 
contribution  behaviour  of  each  member  of  their  group.  For  a  similar  process  on 
eliciting self-reported emotional responses, see also Bosman and van Winden (2002) 
and Cubitt et al. (2008). In particular, subjects were given a list of 13 affective states, 
and were then asked to indicate the intensity with which they felt each emotion when 
they saw the contribution of each other group member. The intensity for each emotion 
was recorded on a 7-point scale (1 = “not at all”, …, 7 = “very much”).
5 The list of 
the thirteen elicited affective states with the order presented to subjects is as follows: 
warmth, anger, fear, envy, sadness, happiness, shame, irritation, contempt, guilt, joy, 
jealousy and surprise – four being positive states, nine being negative states and one 
being neutral state. 
In  a  de-briefing  post-experimental  questionnaire,  we  also  asked  the 
participants what they thought the experiment was about, so we can elicit the demand 
effect explanation. 
A noteworthy aspect of our design is that participants played a one-shot linear 
public  goods  game  under  one  of  the  treatments  described  above.  The  reason  for 
choosing a one-shot interaction is that we wanted to investigate the pure effects of our 
priming process on subjects‟ cooperative behaviour and emotions, and thus, eliminate 
the confounding effects that might come from repeated interaction. Since the effects 
of priming on cooperative behaviour have not yet been explored, in this paper we are 
interested in identifying the existence of such effect and thus, why we chose a one-
shot interaction among subjects. The persistence of such an effect with the repetition 
of the game is a separate issue and warrants further research. 
In total, 51 subjects participated in the NP-treatment and 54 in the P-treatment. 
All subjects were recruited at the University of York,  using the ORSEE software 
(Greiner,  2004).  Their  vast  majority  was  undergraduate  students  from  different 
academic  fields.  The  experiment  was  conducted  in  the  Centre  for  Experimental 
Economics (EXEC) lab and both treatments were computerised and programmed with 
the  software  z-Tree  (Fischbacher,  2007).  At  the  end  of  a  session,  subjects  were 
                                                 
5 Appendix C provides a screenshot of the interface we used for eliciting self-reports on emotions.   8 
privately paid according to their total amount of guilders from the one-shot linear 
public goods game, using an exchange rate of £0.40 per guilder. Average earnings per 
treatment were as follows: £9 for the NP-treatment and £9.34 for the P-treatment. 
Sessions lasted, on average, 50 minutes, with no session taking more than 60 minutes. 
 
2.3 Hypotheses 
Assuming subjects only care about their own earnings, the linear public goods 
game  has  a  unique  Nash  equilibrium.  As  explained  in  Section  2.1,  the  cost  of 
contributing  one  token  to  the  project  is  less  than  the  private  return  on  that,  and 
therefore, it is in any subject‟s material self-interest to keep always all one‟s own 
tokens. However, there is rich experimental evidence indicating that subjects diverge 
from these standard game theoretic predictions. In one-shot versions of the public 
goods  game, participants on average contribute approximately 40% of their initial 
endowment of tokens. Relying on this established literature, we expect subjects to 
contribute to some extent to the public good both in the NP-treatment and the P-
treatment. 
However, it is hard to derive a definite prediction of whether there should be a 
difference in behaviour between the NP-treatment and the P-treatment. For instance, 
although the inequity aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or the model of 
equity,  reciprocity  and  competition  by  Bolton  and  Ockenfels  (2000)  can  explain 
contributions to the public good, these theories cannot account for any subtle effect 
inherent  in  the  environment  in  which  individuals  interact,  such  as  priming.  Yet, 
motivated by existing experimental evidence,  one can reason as follows to derive 
plausible hypotheses. 
First, experimental findings from social psychology demonstrate that priming 
impacts on a wide range of individuals‟ attitudes and behaviours (e.g., see Bargh and 
Ferguson, 2000; Duckworth et al, 2002; Vohs et al, 2006; Bargh and Morsella, 2008). 
These findings suggest that individuals who have been primed in a positive way show 
enhanced  pro-social  behaviour,  reporting  higher  levels  of  cooperation,  relative  to 
individuals who have been neutrally primed. 
On  the  other  hand,  recent  evidence  from  economic  experiments  has  also 
indicated  that  characteristics  of  the  environment  that  should  have  no  effect  on 
individuals‟  choices  turn  out  to  influence  their  actual  behaviour.  For  instance, 
Altmann and Falk (2009) investigates the influence of non-binding default rules on   9 
voluntary cooperation. Their findings suggest that non-binding defaults particularly 
influence  contribution  decisions  of  participants  with  lower  levels  of  cognitive 
reflection,  whereas  contributions  of  participants  with  high  scores  on  a  cognitive 
reflection test are virtually unaffected. In addition, Kirchsteiger et al. (2006) report an 
experiment showing that individuals in a good mood have higher levels of generosity 
in a gift-exchange game. Capra (2004) records strong effects of induced mood in a 
dictator  game,  where  good-mood  subjects  were  more  helpful  or  altruistic,  while 
Oswald et al. (2009) find that an exogenous shock in people‟s happiness increase their 
productivity levels in a paid task. As priming cooperation can act as a subconscious 
reminder  for  people  to  behave  pro-socially,  we  expect  individuals‟  propensity  to 
cooperate to be higher in the P-treatment than in the NP-treatment. Thus, our first 
hypothesis suggests that subjects‟ contributions will be higher in the P-treatment than 
in the NP-treatment. 
Second, as a complementary tool to investigate the role of priming, we elicited 
individuals‟  self-reported  emotional  responses.  Recent  experimental  evidence 
demonstrates emotional responses to be closely related with observed experimental 
behaviour,  with  positive/negative  emotions  being  connected  with  positive/negative 
concerns (Bosman  and  van Winden, 2002;  Cubitt  et  al.,  2008;  Fehr and Gächter, 
2000).  Since  positive  priming  generates  positive  concerns  in  the  environment 
individuals interact, we expect them to respond emotionally in an analogous way.  
To analyse emotions, we ask each individual to report their emotions after 
they have seen the other players‟ contributions. For instance, player i is asked to 
report how happy they are with players j and k after they have seen what players j and 
k contribute, which gives us two emotions data points for each player in the group.
6 
For our analysis, we use the “emotions‟ function”, which gives aggregate emotions in 
a given category (either positive or negative) as a function of deviations of players j‟s 
contributions  from  player  i‟s  own  contribution.  For  instance,  the  mean  positive 
emotions‟ function plots mean positive emotions as a function of deviations of players 
j‟s contributions from player i‟s contribution. We expect the “emotions‟ function” to 
be negatively sloped in the negative deviation interval (i.e. when players j contributes 
less than player i) for the negative emotions, and positively sloped in the negative 
deviation interval for the positive emotions. We hypothesise that, within the range of 
                                                 
6 We refer to player i as the individual who express his/her emotion, player j as the comparison partner 
and player k as the non-comparison partner.   10 
the positive deviation interval (i.e. when players j contribute more than player i), for 
the negative emotions the function will be negatively sloped; whereas, for the positive 
emotions,  it  will  be  positively  sloped.  Motivated  by  our  first  hypothesis,  our 
expectation is that, with respect to priming, the emotions‟ function will move or be 




3.1 Levels of contributions 
Does positive priming lead people to contribute more? Figure 1 provides a 
first  pass  at  this  question  by  presenting  the  distribution  of  contributions  across 
participants  in  the  two  groups.
7  Three interesting patterns emerge. First, in both 
treatments contributions of either 0 or 10 tokens are the modal contribution levels. 
Specifically, 45% of the subjects in the NP-treatment and 37% of the subjects in the 
P-treatment completely free ride, whereas the percentage of those who contribute 10 
tokens is quite similar in both treatments (22% in the NP -treatment and 20% of the 
subjects in the P -treatment). Second, complete co -operators (that is, subjects who 
contribute their total endowment) appear only in the P-treatment (13%), while none of 
the subjects in the NP-treatment contribute 20 tokens. Third, as for the other levels of 
contributions, they seem to be fairly widely spread across both treatments. Performing 
a  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test,  we  find  no  significant  differences  between  the 
treatments (p-value = 0.552).  
We reach the same conclusion when we  consider the average contributions. 
Here, average contributions were 5 tokens in the NP-treatment, with a standard error 
of 0.773 (N = 51), and 6.89 tokens in the P-treatment, with a standard error of 0.932 
(N = 54). A non-parametric ranksum Wilcoxon test suggests that average contribution 
levels are not significantly different, irrespective of the presence of pr iming (two-
sided test; p-value = 0.249). 
  The statistical indifference in the raw averages of contribution between the 
treated and the non-treated groups may be due to the unaccounted char acteristics of 
the participants, such as gender, field of studies an d possibly nationality,  so we 
                                                 
7 At the end of the experiment, we asked individuals to write down what they thought the experiment 
was about. Several individuals suggested that the word search made them think more cooperatively. So 
to control for this, we have taken out these individuals and the following results remain the same. 
Therefore, the prime here is separate to induced demand effects.   11 
control for these in Table 1. This Table presents OLS estimates of the priming effect 
on contribution with no controls. Column 1‟s regression reproduces Figure 1‟s results: 
the P-group contributed 1.889 more than the NP-group, though the difference between 
the two groups is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Column 2 adds a 
control on the participants‟ gender. Here, we can see that the coefficient on priming 
increases from 1.889 to 2.104, and it is significant at the 10% level. Similarly, the 
female coefficient is 2.375, with a well-determined standard error at the 10% level of 
1.225. This is consistent with previous studies on public good games (e.g., Nowell 
and Tinkler, 1994), which find evidence of women being more generous and tending 
to contribute more, on average, compared to men. Because females contribute more 
on average compared to males and that there are proportionately more females (52.5% 
of all female subjects; N = 61) in the NP-group compared to males in the NP-group 
(43.2% of all male subjects; N = 44), it partly explains why there is an insignificant 
raw data difference in the level of contributions between the P-group and the NP-
group.  
  One  question  of  interest  would  be  whether  women  are  more  sensitive  to 
priming compared to their male counterpart. Croson and Gneezy (2009) review the 
literature and find significant differences in social preferences for men and women. 
Whilst  there  is  evidence  suggesting  a  significant  difference  in  the  average 
contribution levels between male and female participants, little is known whether men 
and  women  are  both  equally  susceptible  to  methods  that  activate  their  implicit 
memories, such as priming for example. Column 3 tests this hypothesis by dividing 
the sample into four groups: Male neutrally-primed (N = 19); Male positively primed 
(N = 25); Female neutrally-primed (N = 32); and Female positively primed (N = 29). 
With “Male neutrally-primed” as the reference category, we can see that the group 
which contributed the highest amounts was the “Female positively primed” group; the 
coefficient on “Female positively primed” group is 4.165, with a statistically well-
determined standard error at the 5% level of 1.777. Both “Female neutrally-primed” 
and “Male positively primed” contributed more of their endowments, on average, than 
“Male neutrally-primed”. Yet the differences in the coefficients are not statistically 
significantly different from each other. By contrast, we can reject the null hypothesis 
at the 5% level that “Female positively primed” is the same across all categories, i.e. 
“Male  neutrally-primed”  (p-value  =  0.0211),  “Male  positively-primed”  (p-value  = 
0.0461),  and  “Female  neutrally-primed”  (p-value  =  0.0443).  The  raw  differences   12 
between the “Female positively primed” and other categories are so striking that it 
also shows up very clearly on a diagram; see Figure 2. 
  This result implies that females are significantly more susceptible to priming 
compared  to  males,  i.e.  positively  primed  females  contribute  roughly  3.25  tokens 
more  than  the  neutrally  primed  females.  By  contrast,  priming  seems  to  have  an 
insignificant effect on the male sample. This is reflected in the constant slope in terms 
of male contribution across the NP and P groups.  
  Columns  4 and 5 replicate the previous two columns,  but  adding standard 
controls on the participants‟ field of study and nationality. Controlling for fields of 
study and nationalities yields similar coefficients on priming as the ones obtained in 
Column 3. We observe that there is little evidence that economics students contribute 
significantly different compared to non-economics students and that there is also no 
statistical  difference  in  terms  of  contribution  between  UK  students  and  non-UK 




3.2 The role of beliefs 
We next analyse how priming impacts on beliefs about other group members‟ 
contributions.  As  a  first  step,  we  examine  how  contributions  and  beliefs  about 
contributions  are  correlated  for  each  of  our  two  treatments  separately.  This  is 
illustrated in Figure 3, in which contributions are plotted as a function of beliefs about 
contributions.  Circles  represent  combinations  of  contributions  and  beliefs  about 
contributions  per  treatment,  with  the  size  of  the  circles  being  proportional  to  the 
number  of  observations.  Circles  on  the  horizontal  axis  correspond  to  zero 
contributions; whereas, circles on the diagonal axis indicate contributions that exactly 
match beliefs. 
  Not  surprisingly,  and  in  line  with  earlier  evidence  (see  Dufwenberg  et  al, 
2006),  we  observe  that  there  is  a  positive  relationship  between  contributions  and 
beliefs about contributions in each treatment (see Figure 3). The Spearman correlation 
coefficients  (NP-treatment:  ρ  =  0.572  and  P-treatment:  ρ  =  0.6734)  suggest  that 
contributions and beliefs are positively and significantly correlated (in each treatment 
                                                 
8 In particular, the coefficient “Female positively primed” is significantly different from the coefficient 
“Male  positively  primed”  (p-value  =  0.0644).  This  is  also  the  case  regarding  the  coefficients  of 
“Female positively primed” and “Female neutrally primed” (0.0445).   13 
p-values = 0.000), with the priming treatment indicating a slightly higher correlation 
between contributions and beliefs. 
Looking at average levels of beliefs about contributions, we find no significant 
differences (two-sided test; p-value = 0.2718) performing a non-parametric ranksum 
Wilcoxon test. Yet, recall from our analysis in the previous section that our priming 
technique has a significant impact on contribution behaviour controlling for subjects‟ 
gender. More specifically, we found that females are significantly more susceptible to 
priming compared to males, whereas, priming seems to have an insignificant effect on 
the male sample. Here, we investigate whether a parallel finding holds with respect to 
beliefs about others‟ contributions. In other words, do female primed subjects believe 
that their group members will contribute more compared to male primed subjects? 
Figure 4, which plots beliefs about contribution in each of our four groups previously 
defined, provides an affirmative answer to this question. In particular, we find that 
primed females believe that the other two group members will contribute, on average, 
9.52  tokens,  while  primed  males  report  a  value  of  average  beliefs  equal  to  6.44 
tokens. This difference is significant at 5% level (ranksum Wilcoxon test; two-sided 
test; p-value = 0.0351). In addition, in the P-treatment, we also find that females 
believe that others will contribute significantly more relative to females in the NP-
treatment  (ranksum  Wilcoxon;  test  two-sided  test;  p-value  =  0.0212).  However, 
looking only at the male sample, we find no significant differences across treatments 
(ranksum Wilcoxon test; two-sided test; p-value = 0.3760). 
Table  2  provides  econometric  evidence  supporting  Figure  4.  Using  OLS 
regressions, Column 1 suggests that the observed gender difference in contributions 
can be explained through a difference in beliefs about others‟ contributions. Here, we 
see  that  the  coefficient  of  the  dummy  variable  “Female  positively  primed”  is 
significantly different from that of the variable “Male positively primed” (p-value = 
0.0202) and “Female neutrally primed” (p-value = 0.0179).
9 
Thus far, our main finding suggests that priming affects people‟s contribution 
behaviour  and  beliefs  about  contributions,  after  controlling  for  their  gender,  with 
females being more susceptible to priming than males. More specifically, the way 
                                                 
9  Adding  further  controls,  such  as  field  of  study  and  nationality,  our  differences  between  the 
coefficients of “Female positively primed” and “Male positively primed”, and between the coefficients 
of “Female positively primed” and “Female neutrally primed” with respect to self-reports of beliefs 
about  contributions  remain  significant  with  p-values  being  0.0212  and  0.0182,  respectively  (see 
Column 3 of Table 2 for econometric evidence).   14 
priming works in our subject pool is in two steps: first, positive primes shift females‟ 
beliefs about the contributions of the other counterparts and then, these beliefs shape 
their motivation and contribution decisions. 
Our  next  step  is  to  determine  whether  the  shift  in  contribution  behaviour 
caused by priming is linked to subjects‟ self reported emotional responses. 
 
3.3 Self-reported emotions 
We investigate how people respond to priming by exploring their self-reported 
emotions  after  contribution  levels  of  the  other  two  group  members  have  been 
revealed. Other than playing a key role in the social preferences literature, emotions 
are interesting in our context because priming has been shown in the psychological 
literature to have a significant impact on individuals‟ emotions, especially positive 
emotions (see, e.g., Williams and Bargh, 2008). 
Recall  that,  in  total,  we  elicited  13  affective  states,  with  positive  states 
comprising warmth, happiness and joy; whereas, negative states comprising anger, 
fear, envy, sadness, shame, irritation, contempt, guilt and jealousy. As a first step to 
identify whether priming had an effect on individuals‟ emotional responses, Figures 5 
and 6 plot, using raw data, mean positive and mean negative emotions as a function of 
the difference between contribution of player j and the contribution of player i. The 
horizontal  axis  indicates  the  deviation  of  player  j‟s  contribution  from  player  i‟s 
contribution, while the vertical axis indicates for each emotion the intensity (ranging 
from 1 = “not at all” to 7 = “very much”) with which a group member felt each 
emotion when they saw the contribution of the other group member. In both figures, 
each dot represents a single observation and the solid line indicates the fitted line of 
the  locally  weighted  regression  of  emotions  expressed  on  the  deviation  from  the 
player i‟s contribution.  
Looking  at  Figure  5,  we  can  see  that  a  positive  relationship  between  the 
deviations of player‟s j contributions from player i‟s contribution and average positive 
affect, which is more evident for the people in the primed group. By contrast, Figure 6 
obtains almost no difference in the relationship between the deviations from player i‟s 
contribution and average negative affect across the non-treated and treated groups. In 
sum,  what  these  two  graphs  seem  to  suggest  is  that  the  priming  effect  is  more 
pronounced in the case of positive emotions relative to negative emotions.    15 
Table  3  provides  some  descriptive  statistics  of  the  average  positive  and 
negative emotions expressed by subjects depending on how the comparison partner‟s  
(player j‟s) contribution has deviated from the own contribution. Here, we observe 
that  average  positive  emotions  between  the  NP-treatment  and  the  P-treatment  are 
significantly different with respect to non-negative deviations (p-value = 0.000), but 
not with respect to negative deviations (p-value = 0.691). However, the same cannot 
be  said  for  the  negative  emotions,  where  their  mean  levels  are  very  similar  both 
regarding non-negative (p=0.327) and negative deviations (p=0.110) from player i‟s 
contribution. 
  To  formally  examine  the  impact  of  priming  on  emotional  responses,  we 
control  econometrically  for  key  factors  of  the  contribution  behaviour,  which  may 
explain self-reports of emotions such as deviations from other players (see Table 4). 
To test whether the positive and negative emotions‟ function differs across treatments, 
we estimated ordered probit model for the average positive and negative emotions 
separately. So our dependent variables are the average of each of the positive and 
negative emotions to player j respectively. These emotional responses are ordered 
from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“very much”).  The independent variables comprise “Player 
j‟s  absolute  negative  (contribution)  deviation”,  “Player  j‟s  positive  (contribution) 
deviation”, “Player k‟s contribution deviation”, and the dummy variable “Priming”, 
which takes on the value „1‟ for the P-treatment and „0‟ for the NP-treatment. We also 
included  two  interaction  terms,  which  indicate  whether  the  slope  of  the  emotions 
function differs with respect to negative and positive deviations across our treatments. 
We  include  “absolute  negative  deviation”  and  “positive  deviation”  as  separate 
regressors, since Figure 5 and 6 suggests that these two different sorts of deviation 
elicit different emotional responses. The variable “absolute negative deviation” is the 
absolute  value  of  the  actual  deviation  of  player  j‟s  contribution  from  player  i‟s 
contribution, when player j‟s contribution is below player i‟s contribution; and zero 
otherwise. The variable “positive deviation” is constructed in an analogous way. The 
variable  “Player  k‟s  contribution  deviation”  is  the  actual  deviation  of  player  k‟s 
contribution from player i‟s contribution. The reason for including such a variable is 
that player i‟s attitude to player j may differ according to the behaviour of player k. 
It  is  clear  from  Table  5  that  priming  has  an  effect  on  the  mean  positive 
emotions, but not on the mean negative emotions, as suggested by Figures 5 and 6. 
More specifically, we find that this difference is reflected on the slope of the mean   16 
positive emotions‟ function, which appears to be steeper with regards to the non-
negative deviation interval (i.e. when player j contributes more than or equal to player 
i) in the primed treatment compared to the non-primed treatment. By contrast, the 
dummy variable “Priming” and its interaction are statistically insignificant both with 




This  paper  reports  an  experiment  on  the  impact  that  priming  has  on 
individuals‟  subsequent  decision  making  in  a  one-shot  social  dilemma  game. 
Motivated by previous findings indicating that elements of the choice environment 
affect people‟s pro-social behaviour and that preferences have a psychological aspect 
to  them,  we  study  the  effects  of  positive  priming  both  on  behavioural  and  non-
behavioural measures of reciprocity. Specifically, our concern is with how priming 
influences  individual‟s  cooperation  rates  and  self-reported  beliefs  and  emotional 
responses. Our findings suggest that, priming is effective in raising contribution levels 
and leads to more socially efficient outcomes compared to an environment where 
priming is absent, controlling for subjects‟ exogenous characteristics, such as gender. 
Females are found to be more susceptible to our priming technique compared to males 
and this difference can be explained due to a move to their expectations about how 
much other group members will contribute. We also find a link between priming and 
emotions, with the effect being more pronounced in mean positive emotions. 
A noteworthy aspect of our findings is the observed difference in contributions 
between males and females. This is in agreement with the explanation suggested by 
Croson and Gneezy (2009) that women‟s behaviour is more context dependent than 
that of men (see also Gilligan (1982)). Specifically, in our setting, we explain our 
findings  following  Eckel  and  Grossman‟s  (1998)  distinction,  in  which  gender 
differences emerge conditional on the level of risk present in the experiment (see also 
Croson and Buchan, 1999). In the presence of priming, the level of risk is arguably 
lower compared to the non-priming case, as in the former case primes can be regarded 
as a device in which subjects can coordinate. For instance, it could be that subjects 
regard  primes  as  anchors  or  focal  points,  inducing  them  to  coordinate  on  more 
                                                 
10 Our observation that priming impacts significantly on the slope of the  mean positive emotions‟ 
function and not on that of the mean negative emotions‟ function is robust after we control for subjects‟ 
gender. 
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cooperative outcomes. As a result, primes reduce the level of risk incorporated in the 
decision  situation  and  women  tend  to  be  more  generous  and  pro-social  in  their 
behaviour. 
Our result may also be due to the nature of the prime, in that women tend to be 
better at „verbal‟ tasks than men (Mozley et al, 2001), and this is related to statements 
that women tend to use more their left „verbal‟ brain hemisphere while men use more 
their right brains (see, for instance, Gur et al, 2000). In this respect, an interesting 
further research avenue is to use images as primes and see whether there is still any 
gender difference (and whether it goes in the opposite direction). 
Like all studies in social science, this study is not without limitations. For 
example, we can say nothing about the long-term impacts of priming on repeated 
behaviours, as well as its general applicability on economically-related behaviours 
other than those observed in public good games. Notwithstanding this, we see our 
findings as an important tool at the hands of policy makers. Specifically, our research 
can have two potential policy implications. Firstly, priming could be used for solving 
collective action problems, such as goods like the commons. Many economic and 
social interactions in real life are envisioned by social-dilemma-type situations that 
require  techniques,  such  as  priming,  to  achieve  specific  behavioural  goals  that 
enhance  social  welfare.  In  addition,  changing  the  language  used  in  the  media, 
education  and  health  promotions,  and  in  public/private  organisations,  can  prime 
people to behave for the social goods.  
Secondly, priming could be a useful tool for the government when designing 
educational and health policies, as well as environmental friendly campaigns. It is 
potentially a viable lever for policy-makers to change behaviour (Vlaev and Dolan, 
2009), but economics needs to understand further when priming works well and when 
it does  not  work so  well.  Further  research  could determine  alternative  primes  for 
reciprocity as well as examine the individual versus group nature of such a prime. For 
instance, recent experimental studies (e.g., Luchan, et al., in press) find that groups of 
people  are  typically  less  altruistic  or  cooperative  than  individuals.  It  would  be 
interesting to determine whether priming can influence decisions at a group level to 
the same extent at individual level. In addition, it is important to examine how long 
such  primes  last,  and  whether  it  prevents  the  well-documented  decay  effect  of 
contributions over repeated interactions.   18 
Future  studies  should  also  try  to  examine  to  distinguish  between  the  two 
explanations that the prime may make me more co-operative and/or make me think 
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Graphs by priming  20 
Table 1: OLS Regressions on the Effect of Priming on the Level of Contributions 
  Dependent variable: Level of contributions 







  2.142+ 
(1.210) 
 
Female    2.376+ 
(1.225) 
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(1.825) 





    0.923 
(1.603) 





    4.165* 
(1.778) 
























R-squared  0.0228  0.0577  0.0693  0.0694  0.0794 
Observations  105  105  105  105  105 
Note: + < 10%; * < 5%; **<1%. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. “Male neutrally 
primed” is the reference category. 
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Figure 2: Contributions by gender and treatment 
 
Note:  Males  neutrally-primed  (N=19);  Males  positively-primed  (N=25);  Females  neutrally-primed 
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Table 2: OLS Regressions on the Effect of Priming on Beliefs about Contributions 
  Dependent variable: Beliefs about contributions 
  (1)  (2) 
Positive 
priming 
   




























  0.707 
(1.055) 




R-squared  0.0731  0.0845 
Observations  105  105 
Note: **<1%. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. “Male neutrally primed” is the 
reference category. 
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Table 3: Some descriptive statistics of mean positive emotions and negative 
emotions 
  Mean positive emotions 
  NP-treatment  P-treatment 
Negative deviations  2.102 (1.138)  2.203 (1.189) 
Non-negative deviations  2.929 (1.553)  4.126 (1.833) 
  Mean negative emotions 
  NP-treatment  P-treatment 
Negative deviations  3.203 (1.087)  2.853 (1.303) 
Non-negative deviations  1.880 (0.961)  1.973 (0.907) 
Note: 1 = “not at all”; 7 = “very much”. Entries are means and standard deviations.  
   28 
Table 4: Ordered Probit Regressions on the Effect of Priming on Mean 
Positive and Mean Negative Emotions 
  Dependent variable: Mean 
positive emotions 

















  -0.095+ 
(0.055) 
  0.111** 
(0.041) 
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positive deviation 
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(0.028) 
 





















Priming × Player 





  0.046 
(0.061) 
  -0.077 
(0.051) 
Priming × Player 






  -0.017 
(0.038) 
 
Observations  127  83  127  83 
Notes: + < 10%; **<1%. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. As mentioned in the 




   29 
References 
 
Altmann, S., and Falk, A. 2009. The Impact of Cooperation Defaults on Voluntary 
Contributions to Public Goods. Mimeo. 
Andreoni,  J.  1995.  Warm-Glow  versus  Cold-Prickle:  The  Effects  of  Positive  and 
Negative  Framing  on  Cooperation  in  Experiments.'  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics, 110: 1-21 
Ariely, D., Loewenstein, G. and Prelec, D. 2003. "Coherent Arbitrariness": Stable 
Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
118: 73-105. 
Bargh, J.A. and Ferguson, M.J. 2000. Beyond Behaviorism: On the Automaticity of 
Higher Mental Processes. Psychological Bulletin, 126: 925-945. 
Bargh, J., A., Gollwitzer, P., M., Lee-Chai, A., Barndollar, K., and Trötschel, R., 
2001.  The  Automated  Will:  Nonconscious  Activation  and  Pursuit  of 
Behavioural Goals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81, 1014-
1027. 
Bargh,  J.A.,  &  Morsella,  E.  2008.  The  unconscious  mind.  Perspectives  on 
Psychological Science, 3, 73-79. 
Bochet,  O.,  T.  Page  and  L.  Putterman,  2006.  Communication  and  Punishment  in 
Voluntary  Contribution  Experiments.  Journal  of  Economic  Behavior  and 
Organization 60, 11-26. 
Bolton,  G.,  and  Ockenfels,  A,  2000.  ERC:  A  theory  of  Equity,  Reciprocity,  and 
Competition. American Economic Review 90, 166-193. 
Bosman,  R.,  and  van  Winden,  F.,  2002.  Emotional  Hazard  in  a  Power-to-Take 
Experiment, Economic Journal 112, 147-169. 
Bosman, R., and Winden, F., forthcoming. Global Risk, Investment, and Emotions, 
Economica. 
Capra,  M.,  2004.  Mood-Driven  Behavior  in  Strategic  Interactions,  American 
Economic Review 94, 367-372, Papers and Proceedings of the One Hundred 
Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. 
Croson R., and Buchan N., 1999, Gender and Culture:  International Experimental 
Evidence from Trust Games, American Economic Review 89, 386-391. 
Croson, R., and Gneezy, U., 2009, Gender Differences  in  Preferences,  Journal of 
Economic Literature 47, 448-474. 
Cubitt, R., Drouvelis, M., & Gächter, S., 2008, Framing and free riding: emotional 
responses and punishment in social dilemma games. CeDEx Discussion Paper 
No. 2008-02, University of Nottingham. 
DellaVigna, S. 2009. Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 47: 315-372. 
Duckworth,  K.L.,  Bargh,  J.A.,  Garcia,  M.,  &  Chaiken,  S.  2002.  The  automatic 
evaluation of novel stimuli. Psychological Science, 6, 515-519. 
Dufwenberg, M., Gächter, S., and Hennig-Schmidt, H. 2006. The Framing of Games 
and the Psychology of Strategic Choice. CeDEx Discussion Paper No. 2006-
20. 
Eckel, C., and Grossman, P., 1998, Are Women Less Selfish Than Men?: Evidence 
from Dictator Experiments, Economic Journal 108, 726-735. 
Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U. 2002. Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of 
Nonselfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation, and Incentives. Economic 
Journal, 112, C1-C33.   30 
Fehr,  E.  and  Gächter,  S.,  2000,  Cooperation  and  Punishment  in  Public  Goods 
Experiments. American Economic Review 90, 980-994. 
Fehr, E., and Gächter, S., 2002, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, Nature 415, 137-
140. 
Fehr, E., and Schmidt, K., 1999. A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 817-868. 
Fischbacher,  U.  2007.  z-Tree:  Zurich  Toolbox  for  Ready-made  Economic 
Experiments. Experimental Economics, 10, 171-178. 
Gilligan, Carol. 1982. “In a  Different  Voice:  Psychological  Theory and Women‟s 
Development,” Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA. 
Greiner, B., 2004. „An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments‟, In: 
Kurt  Kremer  and  Volker  Macho  (Eds.):  Forschung  und  wissenschaftliches 
Rechnen  2003,  GWDG  Bericht  63.  Göttingen:  Gesellschaft  für 
Wissenschaftliche Datenverarbeitung, pp. 79-93. 
Gur, R.C., Alsop, D., Glahn, D., Petty, R., Swanson, C.L., Maldjian, J.A., Turetsky, 
B.I., Detre, J.A., Gee, J., Gur, R.E., 2000. An fMRI study of sex differences in 
regional activation to a verbal and a spatial task. Brain and Language, 74,157–
170. 
Güth, W., Levati, M. V., Sutter, M., Van der Heijden, E., 2007. Leading by example 
with  and  without  exclusion  power  in  voluntary  contribution  experiments. 
Journal of Public Economics, 91, 1023-1042. 
Hertel,  G.,  &  Fiedler,  K.,  1994.  Affective  and  cognitive  influences  in  a  social 
dilemma game. European Journal of Social Psychology 24, 131-145. 
Hertel, G., & Fiedler, K., 1998, Fair and dependent versus egoistic and free: effects of 
semantic  and  evaluative  priming  on  the  „Ring  Measure  of  Social  Values‟. 
European Journal of Social Psychology 28, pp. 49-70. 
Isaac,  M.,  and  J.  Walker  1988.  Communication  and  Free-Riding  Behaviour:  The 
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. Economic Inquiry 26, 585-608. 
Kay, A. C., Wheeler, C. S., Bargh, J. A., & Rossa, L., 2004. Material priming: The 
influence  of  mundane  physical  objects  on  situational  construal  and 
competitive  behavioural  choice,  Organizational  Behaviour  and  Human 
Decision Processes 95, 83-96. 
Kirchsteiger, G., Rigotti, L., and Rustichini, A., 2006, Your morals might be your 
goods, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 59, 155-172. 
Ledyard,  J.  O.,  1995,  Public  goods:  A  survey  of  experimental  research.  In  The 
Handbook  of  Experimental  Economics  (ed.  A.  E.  Roth  &  J.  H.  Kagel), 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Levati, M. V., Sutter, M., van der Heijden, E., 2007. Leading by example in a public 
goods experiment with heterogeneity and incomplete information. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 51, 793-818. 
Luchan, W. J., Kocher, M. G., and Sutter, M. in press. Group Polarization in the Team 
Dictator Game Reconsidered. Experimental Economics.  
Mozley,  L.H.,  Gur,  R.C.,  Mozley,  P.D.  and  Gur,  R.E.,  2001.  Striatal  Dopamine 
Transporters  and  Cognitive  Functioning  in  Healthy  Men  and  Women. 
American Journal of Psychiatry, 158, 1492-1499 
Nowell, Clifford and Sarah Tinkler. 1994. “The Influence of Gender on the Provision 
of a Public Good,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 25, pp. 
25-36. 
Oswald  A.J.,  Proto,  E.,  and  Sgroi,  D.  2009.  Happiness  and  Productivity.  IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 4645.   31 
Sefton, M., Shupp, R., and Walker, J. M., 2007, The effects of rewards and sanctions 
in provision of public goods, Economic Inquiry 45, 679-690. 
Smeesters, D., Warlop, L., van Avermaet, E., Corneille, O., & Yzerbyt, V., 2003. Do 
not  prime  hawks  with  doves:  The  interplay  of  construct  activation  and 
consistency of social value orientation on cooperative behaviour. Journal of 
Personality and Social psychology 84, 972-987. 
Sutter, M., Haigner, S., and Kocher, M.G. forthcoming. Choosing the Carrot or the 
Stick?  –  Endogenous  Institutional  Choice  in  Social  Dilemma  Situations. 
Review of Economic Studies. 
Utz,  S.  2004.  Self-activation  is  a  two-edged  sword:  The  effects  of  I  primes  on 
cooperation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40: 769-776. 
van Winden, F., Krawczyk, M., and Hopfensitz, A., 2008. Investment, Resolution of 
Risk, and the Role of Affect. Working Paper. 
Vlaev, I. and Dolan, P. 2009. From changing cognitions to changing the context: A 
dual-route  model  of  behaviour  change.  Imperial  College  Business  School 
Discussion Paper no. 09-04.  
Vohs, K. D., Mead, N. L., Goode, M. R., 2006, The Psychological Consequences of 
Money. Science 314, 1154-1156. 
Williams,  L.  E.,  &  Bargh,  J.A.  2008.  Experiencing  physical  warmth  promotes 






















   32 
Appendix A – List of primes 
Assist  5.679  Smart  3.321  Participation  5.75 
Obligate  3.25  Unkind  1.679  Responsibility  5.643 
Generous  3.714  Sociable  4.321  Harmony  5.5 
Society  4.964  Loving  3.786  Mutual  5.643 
Community  5.286  Family  4.571  Kind hearted  3.857 
Helpless  2.357  Collective  5.214  Public  4.179 
Trust  5.25  United  5.679  Stingy  2.143 
Friendship  4.786  Cheerful  3.321  Equality  4.643 
Closeness  4.107  Liberal  3.429  Risk  3.25 
Moral  3.786  Reciprocal  4.857  Aid  4.679 
Tight  3.179  Unfair  1.929     
Support  5.5  Honest  4.786     
Sharing  5.679  Kindness  4.321     
Selfless  4.071  Malicious  1.786     
Skilful  3.464  Considerate  4.714     
Collaborate  6.143  Goodness  4.357     
Altruistic  4.286  Contribution  5.571     
Careless  2  Donation  3.75     
Charity  3.857  Teamwork  6.5     
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Appendix B – Experimental instructions 
 
[Note: The instructions used in this experiment are presented below. The instructions 
in the NP-treatment differ from those in the P-treatment only with regards to the first 
experiment, in which subjects need to solve a word search puzzle. The instructions for 




Welcome to this session, and thank you for participating. From now onwards please 
do not talk to any other participants until the session is finished. 
 
During this session, you will take part in two experiments. You will now undertake 
the first experiment. You will learn about the second experiment at the beginning of 




For the first experiment, you need to find the words embedded in the letter matrix 
according to the list presented below. The letter matrix is attached in the next page. 
Words can appear with letters in a straight line either from left to right or from right to 
left reading down or reading up, and diagonally reading either down or up. The words 




BUTTERFLY    TURTLE    UMBRELLA    SHAMPOO 
             
SALAD    CORKSCREW    LAMP    ILLUSTRATE 
             
WINDOW    HAT    CARPET    BUILDING 
             
GASOLINE  PLANT    RIVER    RANCH 
             




You will have ten minutes to solve this word-search puzzle. Your performance in this 
experiment will not affect at all your payment at the end of the session. At the end of 













Welcome to this session, and thank you for participating. From now onwards please 
do not talk to any other participants until the session is finished. 
 
During this session, you will take part in two experiments. You will now undertake 
the first experiment. You will learn about the second experiment at the beginning of 




For the first experiment, you need to find the words embedded in the letter matrix 
according to the list presented below. The letter matrix is attached in the next page. 
Words can appear with letters in a straight line either from left to right or from right to 
left reading down or reading up, and diagonally reading either down or up. The words 




TEAMWORK    ASSIST    RESPONSIBILITY    SHAMPOO 
             
PARTICIPATE    COMMUNITY    LAMP    COLLABORATE 
             
WINDOW    MUTUAL    CARPET    UNITED 
             
SHARE    PLANT    COLLECTIVE    SOCIETY 
             




You will have ten minutes to solve this word-search puzzle. Your performance in this 
experiment will not affect at all your payment at the end of the session. At the end of 
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SECOND EXPERIMENT 
 
You will now undertake the second experiment. If you read the following instructions 
carefully, you can, depending on the decisions that you and other participants make, 
earn a considerable amount of money. It is therefore very important that you read 
these instructions with care. 
 
These instructions are solely for your private use. If you have any questions, please 
ask us. 
 
During this experiment we will not speak in terms of Pounds, but in Guilders. During 
this experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in Guilders. At the end of the 
experiment the total amount of Guilders you have earned will be converted to Pounds 
at the following rate: 
1 Guilder = 0.40 Pounds  
 
At the end of the experiment your entire earnings from the experiment will be paid to 
you in cash. 
 
At the beginning of this experiment, all participants will be randomly divided into 
groups of three. Apart from you, there will be two more members in your group. You 
will not learn who the other people in your group are at any point. 
 
In the following pages we describe the experiment in detail. At the end of this 
introductory information we ask you to do several control exercises which are 
designed to check that you have understood the decision situation. 
 
Detailed information on the experiment 
 
Each participant receives an endowment of 20 tokens. You have to decide how many 
of these 20 tokens you contribute to a group project and how many you keep for 
yourself. The two other members of your group have to make the same decision. They 
can also either contribute tokens to the project or keep tokens for themselves. You and 
the other members of the group can each choose any amount between 0 and 20 tokens 
to contribute. 
 
Every token that you do not contribute to the project automatically belongs to you and 
earns you one Guilder. For the tokens contributed to the project the following 
happens: the project‟s value will be multiplied by 1.5 and this amount will be divided 
equally among all three members of the group. For example, if 1 token is contributed 
to the project, the project‟s value increases to 1.5 Guilders. This amount is divided 
equally among all three members of the group. Thus every group member receives 0.5 
Guilders. 
 
Your income from the project rises by 0.5 Guilders if you contribute one token more 
to the project. At the same time, the income of the other two members of the group 
also rises by 0.5 tokens, because they receive the same income from the project as you 
do. Therefore, if you contribute one token more to the project, the income from the 
project received by the whole group together increases by 1.5 Guilders. It is also true   36 
that your income rises by 0.5 Guilders if another group member contributes one token 
more to the project. After all three members of the group have made their decisions 
about the amounts of tokens they contribute to the project the total income achieved 
by each participant is determined. 
 
How is your income calculated from your decision? 
 
The income of every member of the group is calculated in the same way. As you can 
see, your income consists of two parts: 
 
(1) The tokens which you have kept for yourself („income from tokens kept‟) whereby 
1 token = 1 Guilder. 
(2) The „income from the project‟ calculated as follows: Your income from the 
project = 0.5 times sum of all tokens contributed to the project by members of your 
group. 
 
Your total income in Guilders at the experiment is therefore: 
 
(20 – tokens contributed to the project by you) + 0.5*(sum of all tokens 
contributed to the project by members of your group) 
 
If you do not contribute anything to the project the income from tokens kept is 20. If 
you contribute for instance 7 tokens to the project your income from tokens kept is 13. 
At the same time, the total sum of tokens contributed to the project increases and so 
does your „income from the project‟. 
 




If each of the three members of the group contributes 0 tokens to the project, all three 
will receive an „income from tokens kept‟ of 20. Nobody receives anything from the 
project, because no one contributed anything. Therefore the total income of every 
member of the group is 20 tokens. 
Calculation of the total income of every participant: (20-0) + 0.5 * (0) = 20 
 
Example 2: 
If each of the three members of the group contributes 20 tokens, there will be a total 
of 60 tokens contributed to the project. The „income from tokens kept‟ is 0 for 
everyone, but each member receives an income from the project of 0.5 * 60 = 30 
tokens. 
Calculation of the total income of every participant: (20-20) + 0.5 * (60) = 30 
 
Example 3: 
If you contribute 20 tokens, the second member 10 tokens and the third 0 tokens, the 
following incomes are calculated.  
-  Because you and the second member of the group have together contributed 
30 tokens, everyone will receive 0.5 * 30 = 15 Guilders from the project.  
-  You contributed all your 20 tokens to the project. You will therefore receive 
15 Guilders in total at the end of the experiment.    37 
-  The second member of the group also receives 15 Guilders from the project. In 
addition, he receives 10 Guilders as the „income from tokens kept‟, because he 
contributed 10 tokens to the project. Thus, he receives 15 + 10 = 25 Guilders 
altogether. 
-  The third member of the group, who did not contribute anything, also receives 
the 15 Guilders from the project and additionally the 20 Guilders from the 
„income from tokens kept‟, which means 20 + 15 = 35. 
Calculation of your total income: (20-20) + 0.5 * (30) = 15 
Calculation of the total income of the 2
nd group member: (20-10) + 0.5 * (30) = 25 
Calculation of the total income of the 3
rd group member: (20-0) + 0.5 * (30) = 35 
 
Example 4: 
The two other members of your group contribute 20 tokens each to the project. You 
do not contribute anything. In this case the income will be calculated as follows: 
Calculation of your total income: (20-0) + 0.5 * (40) = 40 
Calculation of the total income of the 2
nd group member: (20-20) + 0.5 * (40) = 20 
Calculation of the total income of the 3
rd group member: (20-20) + 0.5 * (40) = 20 
 




As mentioned above, your endowment in this experiment is 20 tokens. You have to 
decide how many tokens you contribute to the project by typing a number between 0 
and 20 in the input field. This field can be reached by clicking it with the mouse. By 
deciding how many tokens to contribute to the project, you automatically decide how 
many tokens you keep for yourself. After entering the amount of tokens you 
contribute you must press the O.K. button using the mouse. Once you have done this, 
your decision can no longer be revised. 
 
After all participants have made their decisions, your total income will be displayed 
on the following screen: 
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1.  Each group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. Suppose that nobody 
(including yourself) contributes any token to the project. 
  What is your income ?........... 
  What is the income of the other group members?........... 
 
2.  Each group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. Suppose that you contribute 
20 tokens to the project. All other group members each contribute 20 tokens to the 
project.  
  What is your income?........... 
  What is the income of the other group members?........... 
 
3.  Each group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. Suppose that the other two 
group members contribute together a total of  30 tokens to the project. 
  What is your income if you contribute 0 tokens to the project?........... 
  What is your income if you contribute 4 tokens to the project?........... 
 
4.  Each group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. Suppose that you contribute 
8 tokens to the project. 
What is your income if the other group members together contribute a total of 14 
tokens to the project?........... 
What is your income if the other group members together contribute a total of 22 
tokens to the project?........... 
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Appendix C – Screenshot for eliciting emotions 
 
[Note: The screenshot for eliciting self-reports on emotions is presented below. The 
order of emotions was the same in both treatments.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 